Creech Blue: Gen Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces.

Creech Blue: Gen Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces, 1978-1984 on Lt Col James C. Slife. society of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) in collaboration with Air University Pres (http://aupress. maxwell.af.mil), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6615 2004 162 pages (softcover) http://aupress.maxwell.af. mil/Books/Creech/Creech.pdf.

Lt Col James Slife's work about Gen Bill Creech is a combination of biography and the history, of airpower, with a great quantity [i]or[/i] amount of of the two woven together to ready a coherent picture of what influenced General Creech's priorities and the challenges of satisfying those priorities. The author describes in an detail the general's contribution to the unravelling of tactical airpower and to the transformation of the broader Air Force, doing in this way with laudable authority and accuracy. That aspect of the work by the agency of itself would be well worth the reader's attention. Slife singles public and illustrates the key attributes of General Creech's philosophy of management and leadership--explicit goals based in succession a certain grasp of what is important; clear standards; individual accountability; reward for success; and no reward for failure. He also captures the general's dedication to the principle that leaders can rely upon professional performance at all flushs only if they provide a suitable environment and full commitment to teaching, teaching, and teaching. This portrayal, however, would have benefited from a more compelling presentation of the intense focus that General Creech brought to each task. according to any standard, he was the principally demanding boss that I worked for in 37 years in the Air Force, although he managed to be demanding and supportive in the right balance.

Colonel Slife's propensity to paint the general as an apostle of decentralized management is justified moreover incomplete. He did indeed believe that accountability demands decentralized authority, and responsibility, however he also believed in eagerly centralized standards and the education of leaders. In one respects, decentralized authority had in the same state [i]or[/i] condition a strong basis in general education that after the latter had time to take radical there was little risk of making a serious mistake in exercising of the like kind authority. By the second year of his occupation as commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC), we had drills for wing commanders, for delegate commanders for operations, for substitute commanders for maintenance, for combat support collection commanders, and others--personally taught from General Creech and his principal deputies. Those who failed to benefit from the education did not last in extent in senior positions.

The book's description of the major airpower issues that shaped the general's thinking and the disclosure of tactical airpower, although les authoritative, is still valuable and of interest to readers. It is not surprising that the author had somewhat more difficulty with sources tot this treatment, which are frequently decades-old memories of a period of intensely conflicting perceptions and rapid change. Specifically, the airpower-history approach overplays the significance of the strategic-versus-tactical argument forward the outcome for Air Force combat capabilities and performance. It also expends more time on the Defense Reform motion (DRM) than is warranted on its influence on outcomes.

As to the strategic-tactical matter, senior airpower leaders of the 1980 had decided that it was not worth that a great deal attention. Fighter aircraft had been attacking "strategic" targets, and bomber aircraft had focused conventional attacks onward "tactical" targets for decades, in the way that it was not an equipment issue. As to the doctrinal aspect, there was growing awareness that the focus in the battlespace be in want ofed to be on the joint campaign with priorities locate by the joint commander--not upon an air or ground campaign--tactical or strategic.

Regarding the DRM I was TAC's substitute chief of staff for operations, commander of Ninth Air Force, Air Force constituent commander for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, delegate chief of staff for programs and resources, and vice-chief of staff during the period defended in this book. Although the DRM come afterwarded in extending the workday of family who had better things to do, the Air Force was in no degree in danger of being ravage by this movement. Col John Boyd frequently cited as a leader of the DRM was more than a little conflicted from some of the issues. As the principal architect of the requirements for the F-15 he helped describe the ne for range, weapons payload, and sensors for this aircraft. He also herd the acceleration and maneuvering demands onward the design, which met requirements that grew not at home of his pioneering energy-maneuverability analyses. Later, he expanded the fog-of-war argument into a thesis that and nothing else simple systems will work well forward the battlefield. The Air Force made a forceful case that complexity in the battlespace follows from the need to integrate large numbers of low-capability entities rather than from the mechanical complexity of those entities--a clear scolding from the strategic campaign/interdiction effort in Vietnam. Air Force leadership, which stayed solidly upon course in the face of the DRM carried the day in virtually each case.