Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda from John Keegan.

Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda from John Keegan. Alfred A. Knopf (http://www.randomhouse.com/knopf/ homehtml) 1745 Broadway, novel York, New York 10019, 2003 416 pages, $3000 (hardcover), $1500 (softcover)

Since the conflict of 11 September and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the enthrall of intelligence has received a great deal of attention. With auspicious timing, therefore, John Keegan's latest part tackles Intelligence in War, promising a meditation of Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. It is fascinating and fast paced yet not necessarily convincing.

Undoubtedly, Keegan is exactly what the dust jacket describes him as: "Britain's foremost military historian," which may be exactly the question He made his name with the seminal work The Face of Battle, a close attention of soldiers' experience in war--what a new management consultant might call "human factors in warfare." At the time (1976) this approach exhibited much-needed innovation since military history attended towards dry recitation of issues and analysis of generals' decisions onward maps. Keegan did much to impose blood, sweat, and tears back into the contemplation of military history; indeed, his hallmark has become the telling of riveting tales of human experience in war and reminding academics not to forget war's faithful (bloody) nature. In this regard, his work has prov pivotal and perhaps without equal, for he writes with truthful dash. In fact, he has made something of a rebel name for himself in academia with his candidly expressed scorn for the tedious, jargon-laden dull of so many of his counterpart academics. Reflecting this perspective, Keegan's central theme asserts that the importance of intelligence is widely overrated--that in war "foreknowledge is no protection against disaster" and "only force finally counts" "War is ultimately about doing, not thinking," as he concludes

To argue his case, Keegan adopts a case-study approach. After laying without his position in an introduction and first chapter, he proposes seven additional chapters: Adm Horatio Nelson's pursuit of a young Napoleon to Egypt Stonewall Jackson's campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, a history of radio-intercept intelligence in naval action during the First World War, and then four upon the Second World War. single of these, "Crete: Foreknowledge No Help," argues his point especially well. In this little-remembered campaign, a German airborne assault assume the office ofed in capturing the island from Allied upholders who were neither outnumbered nor unsupported. This occurr despite the British ability to read German plans and intentions [i]or[/i] part of to the other the famous breaking of the Enigma collection of laws (the Ultra secret). The other examples from the inferior World War include the US naval victory through the whole extent of the Japanese at Midway (here, Keegan grants that American breaking of Japanese digests played a significant role moreover was not as important as luck) the strive against German U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic (intelligence was absolutely "one factor among many"), and a curious inquiry of the role of the traditional human secret agent in reporting on the German V-1 and V-2 "wonder weapons." He also provides an extremely brief overview of "military intelligence since 1945" and a concluding chapter that argues against the decisive importance of in the same state [i]or[/i] condition intelligence.

As the same would expect from Keegan, the stories he narrates in his case studies make for brilliant military history and riveting reading. This is precisely the point--they are short campaign histories rather than convincing arguments for Keegan's main thesis. In fact, for a work that purports to be a cogitation of intelligence in war, it lay outs rather little time discussing intelligence itself; mainly we get tales of derring-do upon the high seas or far-flung battlefields. All readers will find this tack engaging. Fans of Keegan (or, indeed, of Tom Clancy, who moves an endorsement on the inside flap) will also find it satisfying. Others may be disappointed with his treatment of intelligence. If in the way that such reactions will continue a pattern well established in Keegan's work: universal regard for his writing and thought of the human face in warfare yet mixed reviews from academics regarding his analytical conclusions. His admirers call this sour grapes from the community whose work is never published outside specialty presses

Intelligence in War is thus vintage Keegan. His fans will not be disappointed; his critics will not be convinced. Armchair generals and general readers will not be bored. I heartily praise the book to them. Others can prepare their rebuttals, which are not likely to be as widely read.

Maj Paul Johnston, Canadian Armed Forces

Winnipeg Manitoba, Canada

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